OK. I don’t think you have explained what is attractive about it, apart from that it’s not naive materialism – it does at least acknowledge the hard problem. But it does so in a way that introduces problems that are almost as bad, while making no progress on any other problems.
Note that the core of the theory is precisely an explanation of how emergence occurs, so it can hardly be a criticism of the theory that there is no such explanation - instead you’d need to identify problems with specific aspects of that explanation. I’d be particularly interested in your thoughts on the arguments in the following (which I expect ChatGPT can summarise for you as a start)
That is a deflection. You are demanding I go to all the hard work of trying to understand the details of those theories, when in fact you could just answer the question yourself.
Apologies if I’ve missed it, but I don’t think I’ve seen you present a positive theory of the nature of consciousness yet
Apology accepted, but you have indeed missed it.
I’d like to understand for example a) what you think consciousness fundamentally is,
Consciousness is an emergent phenomena, but it does not emerge from a classical material realm. It emerges from the quantum realm described by both MWI (pre-Cambrian) and von Neumann/Stapp (post-Cambrian). In other words, instead of emerging from a noumenal material realm, it emerges from the system literally described mathematically by John von Neumann in The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. My cosmology is essentially the same as his (with Stapp’s modifications), except that I specify MWI was true (by default) before conscious organisms existed in the cosmos (and therefore able to collapse the wave function at last).
This theory requires what Stapp calls the Participating Observer (replacing von Neumann’s “consciousness of the observer”). This is the observer of a mind (not the contents of that mind), very similar to Atman in Hindu metaphysics. Thus my position is also directly compatible with that of Erwin Schrodinger, who said that “Atman = Brahman” was “the second Schrodinger equation”.
b) why it is that some living beings are conscious and others are not (if that is your view),
That is where the two phases comes in. I associate consciousness with exactly the selection of animals we intuitively think are conscious, which includes nearly all animals. Probably not sponges, maybe not jellyfish, but certainly worms and anything more complex than that. This lines up with the Cambrian Explosion. It leaves the question of what exactly happened in neural tissue at that time. It must be something to do with quantum mechanics, which puts us in the territory of Penrose/Hameroff but I am not sure whether they have got it exactly right. But we need to be looking for something like that.
c) how it is that consciousness can impact the physical world in ordinary causal ways other than quantum collapse (if that is your view)
EDIT: in what other ways can consciousness can impact the physical world, do you think? How do you think consciousness impacts the physical world, if you reject vN/Stapp (as you do)?
I am stating that in the absence of conscious organisms, nothing collapses the wave function, and hence the cosmos remains in an MWI-like state. This explains the teleology Thomas Nagel concludes is the only rational naturalistic explanation for the evolution of consciousness, having rejected emergence for the reasons given below.
From ChatGPT:
In Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (2012), Thomas Nagel critiques standard materialist accounts of consciousness, cognition, and values, including emergence theories. Here’s a summary of what he says about them:
Nagel’s View on Emergence Theories
Nagel acknowledges that emergentism is a common strategy used to explain how complex mental properties like consciousness or reason might arise from simpler physical systems (like brains). However, he finds this explanation unsatisfactory, especially when it is non-reductive (i.e. claims that mental states “emerge” from the physical without being reducible to it).
Key Critiques of Emergence in Mind and Cosmos
- Lack of explanatory power
Nagel argues that just saying consciousness or reason “emerges” from physical processes doesn’t actually explain how or why it happens. It’s more a label for our ignorance than a genuine account. He calls this a “brute fact” explanation—unsatisfying for something as central as consciousness.- Implausibility of mental properties just arising from the physical
He finds it unlikely that something as qualitatively different as consciousness could just suddenly appear once matter is arranged in the right way, with no prior presence or tendency in the natural order. This suggests to him that mind must be a fundamental aspect of the universe.- Emergence can’t explain normativity
When it comes to reason and values (not just sensory consciousness), Nagel thinks emergence theories completely fail. Reason involves logical norms and objective truths, which cannot plausibly arise from purely physical or biological processes.- Biological evolution alone can’t account for the emergence of mind
He argues that the Darwinian framework, while successful in explaining physical traits, can’t explain consciousness or reason, even if one adds an emergentist layer. For Nagel, this means there must be something missing in our basic conception of nature.
Nagel’s Alternative: Teleological Naturalism
Rather than emergentism or supernaturalism, Nagel proposes that the universe has a teleological dimension—that is, a natural tendency or “bias” toward the development of life, consciousness, and reason. This is not divine design, but a kind of built-in directionality in nature. He calls this view teleological naturalism, and it implies that mind is a fundamental part of the natural order, not an accidental byproduct.
Summary Quote:
“Consciousness is not just an add-on… If mental phenomena are nonphysical in this way, then the standard evolutionary account of the origin of humans… cannot be regarded as a complete explanation.”
My argument is that the telos was not, as Nagel proposes, the result of teleological laws. It wasn’t imposed in that way. Rather, it was structural – it was the result of consciousness inevitably evolving in one of the MWI timelines, at which moment it collapsed the primordial wavefunction and vN/Stapp became true. And that was the starting gun for the Cambrian Explosion.