Bourdieu and The Livelihood Problem

Posting this thread in response to the insightful and informative presentation introducing some of the main points in Bourdieu’s theory by @Martin.

As mentioned in the presentation, people are seamlessly conditioned by the dominant ideologies of their time, and these dominant ideologies inform our ‘common sense’, ‘taste’, our ideas of what matters and what is legitimate within a society, and our very being- which in turn reproduces some of these ideologies and ways of being.

I just want to open up the discussion here by emphasizing that part of the reason why this happens (maybe even the main reason) is ‘to make a livelihood’, and that almost everyone always must adapt to certain ideologies so as to ‘make a livelihood’ (as you also briefly point out in the presentation). Perhaps this isn’t always the case; but in a way, it feels like in order to make a livelihood, you must be shaped and conditioned by the common sense of a particular context or ‘social field(s)’, you must ‘buy into’ the way of speaking, dressing, believing, valuing, and have certain capacities which aligns with this ideology; and all (or most) ‘social fields’ are entangled with a common sense, taste, or ideology which one is more likely to be believe, or adopt since it supports their livelihood. And in some cases, they might not necessarily agree with it, but more so ‘put up with’ or hold a certain tension to it so as to sustain a livelihood.

In short, our ‘making a living’ requires adapting to a common sense set of ideas, values, norms which might not be ones we would actually levitate to, but are ones that many people adopt in order to survive.

What if you don’t agree with these ideas of common sense, values, and the way things are done, and instead want to explore new values, ways of being, and think other capacities are important? In these cases, you (probably, although not necessarily) will struggle to make a livelihood, and still have to adapt to the ideology of a dominant culture anyway- and in a way that puts you in position with ‘less capital’ (of different kinds). In turn, it becomes harder or more difficult to experiment with and explore new kinds of being or social fields with ‘less capital’.

Perhaps Bourdieu sees this as a necessary (perhaps even obvious) part of the process, but I just wanted to emphasize this point, also as a general way to open up the discussion on Bourdieu, and as a way to problematize a more specific tension in ‘making new fields’, the ‘capacities required’, and societal transformation.

Lastly, in considering these tensions, the idea of Cosmopolitics from Stenger might seem interesting, which discusses how the conditions might be made possible to experiment with different forms of being (or practices), or in Bourdieu’s language as a way to ‘build new fields’.

1 Like

Thanks Matthew, that was beautiful! I very much agree with everything you’re suggesting here.

A little bit about the process of acquiring habitus that inevitably turns out to be the knowledge and the disposition influenced by the dominant ideology and worldview.

Let me start with “innate” common sense.
Pierre Bourdieu thinks that we don’t have “common sense” which is a good sense. He says it’s all acquired through the process of “socialisation”.

Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand, believes in “good sense” and “common sense”. He says that good sense is similar to philosophy and is inherently coherent and critical.

I think we should be aware of these 2 schools of thought on the subject, but I’ll still go with Bourdieu and will introduce my own twist later.

As babies, we’re learning through the process of internalising what is external. The way we learn is through embodiment - our biology manages to adopt certain disposition in the shape of pre-reflexive knowledge. It becomes us!

At this point - there’s no notion of “making a livelihood” - we need software in order to build our reality - which is relational, and we welcome whatever comes down to us. Even the knowledge that we’re given - through family, school and the environment is still primarily guided by the habitus and not by “epigenics” to use that analogy, even though there are elements of it.

It is possible to “interrupt” this vicious circle of habitus, but that requires dismantling social structures. Examples - Russian revolution, Hitler, Trump. One needs to “unmake the world” and “make it again”.

Taste is also part of habitus. There’s “common sense” or good taste - which is always the taste of the dominant class, but it’s not as strict as common sense.

Taste is more like our striving to appear to be like someone else by emulating their disposition and behaviour and in order to make a better living.

With “common sense” - we don’t have that choice because one cannot easily reflect on the validity of it. It is deeply embodied and embedded, so difficult to undo it.

Habitus, in general, won’t be embodied to the same degree in each of us. Some people are relatively open to changes and some extremely resilient.

At the moment I’m looking at the role of neuro-divergency as to a potential indication of individual’s malleability. The most efficient way for individuals with good memory is to rely on memory patterns - it’s quick and reliable.

However, people on a certain spectrum of neuro-divergence (ADHD for example) - have much impaired memory recall and often use intuitive or pre-reflexive thinking.

Ah, interesting, I wouldn’t have thought of that. Another potential angle might be in distrust of authority; some people from an early age get that distrust in parents and it could permeate/manifest through the ‘habitus’ more generally.

Exactly true that babies and children don’t need to make a livelihood; they are just going through socialisation (or individuation). Reflecting on my own experience, the childhood to adolescent and early adulthood range of socialisation more so deals with ‘fitting in’, another kind of pressure or force which pushes one to believe what others believe, regardless of what those things are. Another important caveat being that it is nearly impossible to critically reflect (on a larger level) about certain things of at such an age. Alternatively, I wonder if you think the opposite might also be true, in that a child might see an instance of ‘common sense’ and see it as ‘senseless’ or strange, but is still somewhat coerced into believing it, and then takes it on. Like, for example, having to obey certain manners, fork on one side, knife on the other. Probably some other examples could be interesting.

All of this is reminding me of a movie I recently saw, Captain Fantastic, in which a family tries to live an alternative lifestyle, absorb a different common sense etc.

I suppose what also matters is at what age we acquire “common sense” as the deepest evaluation mechanism.

I’ve dug little bit into examples where different societies have different stance and observed how the concept “slides” a bit when put to test.

In Europe, it’s common sense that one should carry ID documents on them at all times (even when you’re going to a beach). When you explain how we’re not required (here in the UK) to carry any documents on us - it’s met with disbelief. “What is an alternative way of establishing someone’s identity without documents?” But the question could equally be - what’s the need to establish someone’s ID when randomly stopped on the street?

Age of consent - different societies have different rules and different opinions as of what should be the age of consent. Just by setting it at different point - you’re dialectically changing both the observer and the observed.

Conflicts - every single war has audience on both sides and they can all argue how their particular point of view is common sense.

Hmm, an interesting point about age. In a way, it reminds me of the process or phrase of adapting to ‘the real world’ , and here, ‘common sense’ is the ability to adapt to ‘the real world’; and that happens at different ages for different people. (Not a phrase I personally ‘agree’ with too much) Or even ‘growing up’; when people say ‘grow up’ or ‘becoming mature’ it seems the implication is that they take on their own cultural common sense.

And generally, ‘common sense’ is also an interesting phrase because it not only emphasizes what is ‘common’ and ‘shared’, but (in perhaps in leu of this) also what is ‘obvious’; it is something that ‘everyone knows’.

It might also be interesting to think about people who don’t adopt to common sense, and how they are treated by others. Are they outcasted, seen as crazy, how are they ‘dealt with’ or ‘metabolized’? Also potentially interesting to consider the figure of ‘the idiot’ from (again) Stengers, seen here as a person who is more ‘disrupttive’ or hesitant to believe what others readily accept; or even other conceptions of ‘idiots’ (whether in a more toungue in cheek way, or negative usage)

I wonder: what are the ‘boundaries’ for ‘common sense’? I suppose its more of a gradient, and it shifts more gradually for certain things instead of others. Do ‘subcultures’ have common sense of their own, or is it always embedded in a ‘dominant ideology’? I guess the question is: how far does ‘dominant ideology’ extend to? Is it a country (like the US), or can one country have many examples of common sense?

Just another interesting example to throw in: in Spain, teachers are always referred to by their first names, while in the US, it is always ‘Mr.’ or ‘Mrs.’, or Professor. Just a custom, but also leads to a different kind of relationship between throughout education/learning.

Yes, indeed, common sense is such an interesting concept in the light of this perspective. Now, I see it as a meta-term that feeds into so much meaning!

You question about people who don’t adopt the common sense is super interesting!

Now that you raised it - I’d say they are not “neuro-typical” - though I know that’s not a correct classification, but only meant as a direction.

Boundaries, again, very relevant and opens all sort of avenues for further research.

Thanks again for the interesting talk. I think I’m most interested in the question of how common sense varies across social fields. I asked ChatGPT about this here and it suggested that common sense does vary across social fields, though “certain broad social structures (e.g., capitalism, nation-states, or dominant ideologies) can shape a wider common sense that cuts across multiple fields.” Does this sound right to you from your reading?

I’m interested in whether an approach such as this might help in linking Bourdieu’s approach with Spiral Dynamics, in that you could identify different cultural stages (orange rational, green pluralistic) as social fields with different common sense.

The way I read it - Bourdieu doesn’t see common sense as a linear/evolutionary/stage based process, but the result of the dynamics of power within the society. My understanding might be wrong though…

Continuing the discussion a bit on ‘ideology’ here, I had mentioned a work by Louis Althusser being potentially worth looking into, which I have often seen or heard referenced, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus’, and asked chat GPT for a summary, and how it relates to Bourdieu’s ideas around common sense and ideology. Apparently they have slightly different focuses, both perhaps useful to understand how ‘ideology’ works and is reproduced. Also, its a chat gpt summary/interaction so might not be perfect.

Nonetheless:

Althusser’s concepts of ideology and ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) are central to his Marxist theory of how power and social order are maintained. Here’s a breakdown:

1. Ideology as an Immaterial Structure

Althusser sees ideology not as a set of false beliefs but as an unconscious system of representations that structures how individuals experience reality. He argues that ideology is:

  • Omnipresent: It is not confined to politics but operates in all aspects of life.
  • Material: Even though ideology exists in ideas, it manifests through practices, institutions, and rituals.
  • Reproductive: It ensures the continuation of social relations, particularly those that support capitalist production.

2. Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) vs. Repressive State Apparatus (RSA)

Althusser differentiates between two ways the state maintains its dominance:

  • Repressive State Apparatus (RSA): This includes institutions like the police, military, and courts, which function through force.
  • Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs): These function primarily through ideology rather than direct coercion. Examples include:
    • Education system
    • Religious institutions
    • Media
    • Family structures
    • Cultural institutions (art, literature, sports, etc.)

Unlike the RSA, which works through repression, ISAs work subtly, shaping individuals’ beliefs, values, and behaviors so that they conform to the dominant social order.

3. Ideology and Subject Formation (Interpellation)

Althusser introduces the concept of interpellation, which describes how individuals become subjects of ideology. He argues that ideology “hails” people into specific social roles—like worker, citizen, consumer—through institutions and everyday practices. When a person recognizes themselves in these roles, they unconsciously accept and reproduce the existing social order.

Why Does This Matter?

Althusser’s theory explains why power and domination often persist without overt force. People internalize dominant values as “natural” and “obvious,” making resistance more difficult. His work has been influential in media studies, critical theory, and discussions of how ideology functions in contemporary society.

Would you like to dig deeper into any of these points?

You said:

Interesting, this is very helpful. I wonder if Althusser ever references Bourdieu in his work; in particular, I’m wondering how this might fit into Bourdieu’s conceptualization of ‘common sense’

ChatGPT said:

Althusser and Bourdieu were both influential French theorists working in a broadly Marxist tradition, but they approached ideology and social reproduction differently. Althusser does not explicitly reference Bourdieu in his major works, and their key ideas developed somewhat independently. However, there are interesting connections and tensions between Althusser’s concept of ideology (and ISAs) and Bourdieu’s habitus and doxa, which relate to common sense.

1. Bourdieu’s ‘Common Sense’ and Doxa

Bourdieu’s concept of doxa refers to the taken-for-granted, unquestioned beliefs that structure social life. It is a kind of common sense that people absorb through lived experience rather than conscious reflection. Doxa is:

  • Pre-reflexive: People don’t question it because it seems self-evident.
  • Embodied: It is ingrained in practices, habits, and bodily dispositions (habitus).
  • Reproductive: It maintains social order because people act in ways that reinforce existing power structures.

Bourdieu argues that dominant groups control doxa by shaping the conditions in which knowledge and beliefs are formed. This aligns with Althusser’s claim that ISAs shape ideology at a deep, structural level.

2. How Althusser’s Ideology and ISAs Relate to Bourdieu’s Doxa

  • Institutional vs. Embodied Reproduction: Althusser focuses on institutions (education, religion, media) as sites of ideological reproduction, while Bourdieu focuses on practices and embodied dispositions (habitus).
  • Materiality of Ideology: Althusser argues that ideology is material because it is enacted through rituals and practices within ISAs. Bourdieu would agree but emphasizes how these practices become second nature through habitus.
  • Interpellation vs. Habitus: Althusser’s interpellation explains how individuals are “hailed” into subject positions by ideology. Bourdieu’s habitus explains how individuals acquire durable, unconscious dispositions that align with their social positions. Both describe how people come to “fit” into social structures, but Althusser emphasizes institutions, while Bourdieu emphasizes lived experience and bodily conditioning.

3. Can Common Sense be Resisted?

  • For Althusser, ideology is all-encompassing, but contradictions within ideological systems can open spaces for resistance.
  • For Bourdieu, resistance is harder because doxa operates beneath the level of conscious awareness. However, moments of hysteresis (when the habitus no longer aligns with changing social conditions) can create openings for change.

Hi Matthew, just wanted to comment on some of the differences:

  1. I don’t think there’s a much between institutional and embodied reproduction -IMO the only reason why Bourdieu defines the embodiment is to emphasise how difficult it is to be aware of, because it’s beyond cognitive awareness. Those institutions are still present in Bourdieu as social structures and associated institutions.

  2. Bourdieu also describes this phenomenon through “embedding” - embedded within practices, relationships, routines, norms…

I’d need to read more about Althusser’s Interpellation, but both concepts seem aligned.