For the whole of Western history, apart from the last 50 years, very few people even questioned the idea that there was such a thing as the truth. Ancient philosophy assumed it as a goal, and from the late Roman era until the Rennaissance truth was “enforced” by the Catholic authorities. Did this lead to conflict? Yes, including what was arguably the low point in Western history: the Albigensian Crusade, during which the Catholic authorities engaged in total genocide of the Cathars because the Cathars were offering much deeper truths than the deeply corrupt Church could tolerate.
The Rennaissance and the Protestant Reformation were both examples of great changes in Western society resulting from a rejection of the Catholic monopoly on truth and commitment to a new, independent search for truth. The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (the Age of Reason) were yet another example of a re-invigorated, re-launched search for truth. However, in both cases (science and Enlightenment philosophy), that search ended in partial failure, and in both cases the problem was consciousness. Science couldn’t even define consciousness, and is still structurally incapable of doing so in a coherent way. Hume tried to provide a philosophical foundation for a science of consciousness (“moral subjects”), but ended up with unresolvable paradoxes. Kant then formalised these paradoxes (he called them “the Antimonies”) into a metaphysical-epistemic system which forever banished “objective truth” to a noumenal world that humans can’t even cognise, let alone access. But science and analytical philosophy nevertheless continued to search for truth. Neither has suceeded in producing a coherent model of the whole of reality, but both are still committed to that as a goal.
The descent into outright truth-denial began with Nietzsche, but it was only the rise of postmodernism which institutionalised the total denial of objective truth. The postmodernists gave two justifications for this, which don’t sit comfortably with each other (but that doesn’t matter to postmodernists, because postmodernists don’t believe in the truth). The first was “truth is unattainable” and the second was “truth is authoritarian, and truth-claims lead to conflict and oppression”. The toxic, corrosive effects of this anti-epistemology on modern society are hard to overstate. The perfect example is gender ideology, where there was a systematic attempt to impose non-truths as truths. The postmodernist political philosophers spread a load of cynical lies about the relevant science, and then insisted that the rest of society should accept that people with male bodies and Y chromosomes can actually be women, and demonised anybody who disagreed, accusing them of “hate speech”. Many Western politicians accepted this, resulting in men competing in women’s sports, being put in female prisons and being allowed in refuges designed for women who had been abused by men. This was madness, and it was only reversed after two decades of intense “culture wars”. I don’t think I need to elaborate further on this – we all know what has happened.
Metamodernism was supposed to put this right, and Jason Storm’s version actually does. The single most important feature of metamodernism, distinguishing it from postmodernism, is the acceptance that this systematic truth-denial was a catastrophic mistake. It resulted in nihilism, the meaning crisis, and ideological paralysis. Storm is essentially saying that we need to take the best lessons from postmodernism, but that the time has come to accept that there is such a thing as truth after all, and that the whole of Western society needs, once again, to re-invigorate and renew its search for truth. That is the new paradigm which is needed – a new kind of search for the truth which does not repeat the genuine mistakes of modernism (especially physicalism and reductionism). We need the right hemisphere sort of truth, not just the left hemisphere kind.
Second Rennaissance does not practice Storm’s version of metamodernism. The moment I start talking about a collective search for objective truth, the response I get here is pure postmodernism: the outright rejection of the idea that objective truth is either possible or desirable. This is not a contingent state of affairs – 2R isn’t rejecting the idea of truth for no reason. The reason is abundantly clear: 2R’s methodology is perspectivist – it is an attempt to create collective meaning by accepting and trying to understand other people’s perspective. Any claim to truth is therefore viewed exactly how the postmodernists viewed it: as a threat.
This sets up a show-stopping problem. If all 2R is ever willing to do is to try to construct collective meaning without ever committing to a collective search for the truth, then its attempt to foment a Second Rennaissance is logically doomed to fail. The problem is that if there is no collective acceptance that a search for truth is both possible and desirable, then there is no internal pressure on individuals to change their own thinking in response to contradictions, lies, deceptions, mistakes, and everything else which blocks the path to truth. It’s too easy. It does not require the difficult “internal work” required when one’s own model of reality is demonstrated to be lacking. You cannot collectively approach truth if you prioritise social politics over the truth itself. Note that this was always the biggest criticism that both analytical philosophy and science had of postmodern philosophy: if you aren’t constrained by logic or empirical evidence, then it is a free-for-all. Anybody can say anything they like. It doesn’t actually have to have any fixed meaning, and it certainly doesn’t need to respect the truth. Is it any surprise that this led to a “meaning crisis”? 2R’s problem is that it still sees postmodernism as the pinnacle of Western thinking. I don’t think the problem can be fixed until/unless 2R is willing to collectively admit that, in fact, postmodern relativism was a disastrous mistake.
So…can 2R, as a movement, fix its broken relationship with the truth?